JPRS 74399 18 October 1979

Latin America Report No. 2060



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No. 2060




Current Political Attitudes Reviewed

JPRS 74399

18 October 1979


(ULTIMA CLAVE, 11 Sep 79) eeeeeaeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeee

Foreign Issues Viewed by Press

(Editorial; LA PRENSA, 1k, 17, 19 Sep 79) eeeeeeeseeeere

Attitudes Towards the PLO The Puerto Rican Issue Soviet Troops in Caribbean

Schoenfeld Writes on Soviet Troops in Cuba, Nation's Attitude (Manfred Schoenfeld; LA PRENSA, 6 Sep 79) wesecccccseces

Bussi Disclaims Any Presidential Ambitions


Peronist Labor Leader Calls for Elections

(LA NACION, 2h Sep 79) eeeneeeeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

Grondona Speaks on Constitutional Reforms, Political Plan (LA OPINION, 6 Sep 79) eeeeeeeeeeee ev eee eeeeeeeseeeeeeeeee

PPC Leadership Remains at Variance on Political Strategy (LA NACION, ll Sep 79) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeve eee eeee

1980 Budget Proposes To Hold Down Public Expenditures (LA NACION, 16 Sep 79) eernreveeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeee

Internal Security: Economic Crimes, Police Growth, Prisoners (Various sources, various dates) .ccccccccccccesrceccece

[III - LA - 144]








CONTENTS (Continued)

Theft of Cigarettes, by Lazaro Bravo Theft of Auto Parts, Tools, by Lazaro Bravo Counterfeit Refrigerator Purchase Permit, by Lazaro Bravo Housing Swindler Penalized, by L. Bravo Deficiencies in Education, by Agnerys Sotolongo MININT Officers, Sergeants Promoted, by Agnerys Sotolongo Police Patrol Graduates, by Enrique Sanz Fals Political Prisoners

Military Developments: Graduation, Maneuvers, Aviation (Various sources, various dateS) cecccccccccccccecece

Largest Academy Graduation Class, by Jorge L. Blanco Military, Patriotic Education Association, by Diana M. Sosa Diaz Moncada 26 Military Maneuvers, by Mario Sarraff, Othoniel Gonzalez Angolan Armed Forces Anniversary, by Jorge L. Blanco Western Army Artillery Competition, by Juvenal Balan Medical Brigade to Nicaragua, by Marta Cabrales Graduation of Pilots, by Pedro Gutierrez San Cristobal Military Exercise, by Jose Mena Perez MININT Graduation, by Enrique Sanz Fals New Soviet TU-154B Aircraft, by Clara Mayo FAR Documentation Center, by Elsa Blanquier Medical Services in Aviation, by Gilberto Guerra


Previsora Bank Employees Denounce Abuse of Power (EL COMERCIO, 22 Sep 79) eeeeeeeev eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeee ®

Bucaram Scorns Misuse of Central Bank Funds (EL TIEMPO, 21 Sep 79) eeeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee ene

Editorial Calls for Moderation in Chamber Disputes (Editorials; EL COMERCIO, 23 Sep 79) secccccecsececess NICARAGUA Nature, Structure, Goals of CDS Explained (BARRICADA, 23 Sep 79) eeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeeeee

Regulations to New Press Law Published (BARRICADA, 2h Sep 79) eeeeeeerereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee








CURRENT POLITICAL ATTITUDES REVIEWED Buenos Aires ULTIMA CLAVE in Spanish 11 Sep 79 pp 446-2 - 446-6 [Text] Political Life

As things are now going, or at least according to announcements or appearances, in 1960 (the 100th anniversary of a generation whose common denominator was political activity and which gave the country stable governments until 1930) people will be talking about politics as they now talk about soccer. This does not mean that they will be talking about elections, and perhaps the political parties, suffering from excessive hibernation possibly, will not be in full operation. But, we repeat, there will be a lot of talk about politics. And an indication that this might well happen is the meeting between the former governor of Jujuy, Horacic Guzman, the head of WUFEPO / Popular Federalist Force / and President Videla. It is taken up elsewhere in this issue, Two or three remarks have to be made in assessing this development. First, the conversation lasted an hour; second, this is the first political figure that President Videla has called in as such and for political matters (not to offer him an embassadorship, for example, as happened with other leaders). This gave wings to the assumption or hypothesis that despite its heterogeneity, or because

of it, FUFEPO was hastening the essential agreements to appear on the scene at the opportune moment as a force with qualifications to carry weight in the immediate political future. But this in no way should lead us to believe that by calling in Dr Gugman, President Videla has given him what is generally called backing. This is not the case, although we could legitimately acknowledge that from now on FUFEPO will cultivate a proximity that will have to be requited in order for it to make sense,

Another development no less talked about than the preceding one is the Buenos Aires ministerial crisis, which is the subject of a more thorough analysis later on. Until the time of the disagreement, the Saint Jean-Smart tandem had operated (everything so indicated) as one, assailing politics, political parties and political leaders with identical vigor, incidentally. In this context, we will recall, former

Minister Smart “went too far” more than once, and although the ~overnor keot up with him, his prose and his pace, his tone in short, were different. This is an interesting observation, because the "political issue" obviousiy seams to be intertwined with the crisis, with a governor in the process of ceasing to be a “hard-liner' and with a minister striving to continue as one, More flexible or perhaps better informed, Governor Saint Jean seems to have had a keen enough sense to place himself in the wake of situations that will be seen more clearly towards the end of the year with the political proposal. Lastly, we cainot rule out that the mere, but fundamental, replacement of several military intendants with civilians, some of whom have well-known, albeit not notorious, political affiliations, has been one of the ingredients in the crisis, which some regard as over and othe.s in full ferment. But Governor Saint Jean has apparently made his move with a precise knowledge of the situation and the direction in which the winds are blowing.

While the Inter-American Euman Rights Commission continues its work;

the radicals talk of their anti-terrorist past; Minister Martinez de

Hoz talks about Argentina in the year 2000 and Admiral Lambruschini about Argentina in August 1979; the FUFEPO people threaten to burst at the seams with swelling pride over the meeting with the president; public opinion witnesses the launching of "a new Saint Jean"; the government

loses sympathy among traditional liberals because of the dogmatic } obstinacy of its education minister, and many Argentines begin to share | a deep-seated concern in noting that two military commanders regard as indis- :

putable the legality of certain goods inherited by Peron's widow, among the ranks of the army the process continues its normal pace towards the year end appointment of its new commander in chief and

the resulting retirement of its current head, Lieutenant General Viola, whose future designation es president of the republic, perhaps in the last third f 1980, is falling deeply into the realm of conjecture.

In issue 444 we set forth the alternatives surrounding the appointment

of the new commander in chief of the army. It is one of those issues

that cannot be examined without taking into account everything surrounding it. Hence, over the next 60 days it will be increasingly commented on hy all, by both protagonists and observers, as a yardstick of the courses of conduct taking shape and of the possibilities opending up.

Now, Civilians

The crisis precipitated in the Buenos Aires provincial government (with

the help of the governor's political acrobatics) demands a precise delineation of the framework in which it has unfolded. We must set forth

the background data that make up the politieal and administrative

framework that while circumscribing it, shapes it as a model for potenticl alternatives in other provinces. The following is a brief chronological

background to the crisis:

1) Dr Smart enters the provincial government at a time when it is one of the poles that most unequivocally supports an apolitical, non- pertisan policy favoring the extension of the emergency measures of the first phase of the process;

2) Under this ajproach, the prevince introduces in-depth administrative and structural changes in state operations, but without altering its substance, and with an initial emphasis on a concentration of power and administrative decision-making.

3) This approach is developed to its maximum extent under these measures with the planning of the Greater Buenos Aires green belt (the ecological belt) and with the programming of various public works (drinking water projects, sanitation projects, etc) within the decision-making sphere of the provincial government.

4) The two trends run parallel, accoupanied by specific statements by Dr Smart about political parties that indicate that they will soon be excluded from decision-making.

5) Almost simultaneously with the start of this last stage (point 3), with or without the assent of Dr Smart, the provincial government decides to begin a process of markedly decentralizing power in order to “revitalize municipal life."

6) This decentralization is accompanied by General Saint Jean's decision to create the “civilian advisory organizations for the municipalities,” to which he confers the worthy task of establishing “dynamic links between the government and the people" (speech to intendants meeting in Pergamino in early August). The initiative is described as a method

of carrying out part of the instructions that came out of the governors’ meeting last May.

7) Purther developing this approach, General Saint Jean repeatedly amnounces his decision to bolster his initiative through the widespread establishment of civilian govermments in those districts in which commanders and officers of the Armed Forces are still performing dvties.

8) In late August, General Saint Jean expresses his desire to implement this political decision, which is strongly objected to by Dr Smart, who also has reservations about the decision to carry out a process of marked decentralization.

To summarize these eight stages, we could say that developments have taken place on two decision-making levels in triggering the Buenos Aires crisis: a) the decision to decentralize power in order to bolster municipal life; bh) the decision to begin a new chapter in this process, civilian participation in govermment. Moreover, decentralization,

the path followed in strictly political matters, reduces the scope of power of the government ministry (Smart) by transferring provincial responsibilities to the strictly municipal level and by rechanneling provincial central government decisions into numerous inter-<city pacts, and at the same time it calls for an in-depth reassesament of the government minister's statements regarding his views on politics.

That this is the case emerges spontaneously from the accounts circulating @S this edition went to press regarding the selection of new officials. Two of them,at least,come from decidedly conservative ranks (Dr Gualberto Mostajo, mentioned as a possible replacement for Dr Smart, and Dr Gaston Perez Izquierdo, the already designated intendant of Lams who in 1973 headed up the list of New Force candidates for deputy from the province of Buenos Aires and who is currently a member of FUFEYO by virtue of his seat on the respective Provincial Coordination Commission). One, and possibly three, are from the radical movement (Dr Cassanello, the president of the Atletico Quilmes Club, president of the delegation of Juvenil de Futbol that traveled to Japan and won there, and a well-knowm adviser to the radical movement in his district of Quilmes; in addition Drs Jose Equiza, a nent leader of Gonzalez Catan's UCR Radical Civic Union_/ and mentioned as a future intendant of La Matanza, and Ruben Cabanillas, the chairman of the Villa Fiorito radical committee and cited since late last week as the probable intendant in

Lomas de Zamora). In conclusion, various sources were asserting that last

week conversations had been held on several levels in which the idea had arisen of possibly appointing men with Peronist affiliations.


We should not be surprisec by this unexpected turn in the provincial govermment if we bear in mind the statements that Brig Gen Omar Graffigna made at one point and that ULTIMA CLAVE printed in issue 435: "We must proceed gradually towards a solution,” the air force commander

asserted; “we must boil down the problems and achieve a full understanding

between civilians and the military." To the extent that gradualisn is expressed as municipal participation and to the extent that this participation entails a dialog, the two terms in the statement by Brigadier Graffigna that we printed and analyzed are unquestionably present in the salient aspects of the crisis. It is obvious that the emphasis that the provincial government has placed on municipal activities differs considerably from the political alternatives suggested so far by civilian sectors themselves. In keeping with the ¢=neral political tradition, these sectors have called for nationwide, rather than fragmentary or sector—based solutions. Nonetheless, the gradualist approach has not prompted serious objections, in that the government itself has not yet spelled it out. In this regard, it will have to be the proposal that sheds some light on this issue.

t : }

It is obvious, however, that meanwhile, “the course is being charted en route," and this "course," hinted at and firmed up in the wake of the crisis in the province of Buenos Aires, is marking developments in an initially very clear-cut manner. Perhaps the most striking sign, albeit not perhaps the most outstanding or wideranging in significance, is the presence of political figures. In any case, this is nothing nev, if we bear in mind that since the very beginning of the process @any intendants (see ULTIMA CLAVE No 423) kept the posts that they won in the 1973 elections. Nor is it noteworthy that civilians are going to be appointed, inasmuch as a very high percentage of intendancies throughout the country are in the hands of civilians. The most remarkable aspect is what communities are affected by Saint Jean's pronouncement, In terms of population, economic activity and gross output, a great many municipalities in Greater Buenos Aires are more important than a number of provinces. If, in fact, there will be no change in governors until their terms are over, as General Videla told Dr Horacio Guzman last Wednesday (see further on in this issue), it is nonetheless significant that through a different channel the horizons for participation will be wider than if a civilian political figure were appointed, say, for example, in Cata@arca or La Rioja. These are the essential points that we will have to keep in mind in monitoring future developments in the crisis, which had still not been decisively surmounted as of today, Tuesday.

The First Step

With an eye towards the future, the meeting last Wednesday at the presidential residence of Olivos between the president of the nation, Lt Gen Jorge Rafael Videla, and the president of FUFERO, Dr Horacio Guzman, will be inseparable from this panorama. As ULTIMA CLAVE announced in its last issue, the Jujuy leader was called to the meeting by General Videla himself. The chief executive and the political leader have had smooth relations for several years, and the meeting might be seen as just another of the many that they have held. The gap in time between this get-together and the last confirmed one would not be

a reason for their dialog to be different in nature. But perhaps the distinctive note is the formality with which Dr Guzman conveyed his opinions to General Videla, because he spoke as the head of the political organization of which he is a member.

Their meeting was surrounded by the strictest secrecy. It was held in the presence of the president's political adviser, Dr Prancisco Moyano, and nothing was reported officially. For his part, neither did Dr Guzman give an account of it. However, we can speculate, bearing in mind the organization's latest statements, that Dr Guzman probably conveyed to the chief of state FUFEPO's concern over the immediate absence of political alternatives and, secondly, the concern prompted

by a mumber of irksome facets of economic policy in response to constantly high rates of inflation. WNUYEPO's first point was allegedly backed up by a number of criticiaws of provincial leadership (FUFERO

had already referred to the matter in previous pronouncements) and of the expectations regarding participation. If we allow ourselves to infer from General Videla's other public statements, the concerns expressed were obviously given a predictable response. In this connection, and beginning with the last point, the chief executive probably reaffirmed the decision that there would be no changes in economic leadership during his term, which ends on 29 March 1981, and that the economic course

that has taken shape would be kept to wit. “xe same steadiness as it has been so far. He probably also reaffirmed ti political decisicn to guarantee channeis of input and dialog amoist aiid with the various sectors of the population. In addition, he obviousi; “us: Aave confirmed his oftemade assertion that for the moment there a, no changes on tap in

the list of governors who have been with him, with minor variations, since he took up his post.

Perhaps the meeting was significant not so much because of the opinions that might have been exchanged (even if this was as important as described above) but because it took place at all. Similar contacts at this level, for the stated purposes, have obviously not been made since 24 March 1976, and the meeting was undeniably a significant development. To all this

we can add the likelihood that the president formulated thoughts regarding the need to restructure political activities in keeping with the new times and with future expectations of a strong, representative

democracy, the ultimate and repeatedly announced goal of the process.

Meetings in the Works

The radical ranks are anxious to find out whether the national plenary meeting called by Ricardo Balbin for late this month will again be postponed.

Provincial plenary meetings "to sound out opinions” have been held since mid-year, and another, called by Dr Juan Trilla, will be held Tuesday of next week in the capital district. These jurisdictional plenary sessions are being held to gather opinions and initiatives with a view towards the national plenum, and among other things they are discussing the recommendation made by Dr Balbin 4 months ago that opinions be expressed on various topics that seem to be connected with a political


It is apparent, however, that this sort of “internal” canvassing by the radical movement has been generating tense battle lines that are

formulating approaches with much wider horizons for the group. We could describe the situation, without exaggeration, as a smooth framework for


fosmulating decisions not only in regari to contingent developments but also in commection with the party's very future. Despite Dr Balbin's durability as parity leader, a potential replacement for hiz is obviously one of the irksome issues. We could more or less accurately point to two trends that have taken shape in some detail in the recent past and that, as of today, represent a steady and growing concentration around the party leadership headed by Dr Balbin nd suggestive attempts by the Alfonsino faction to increase its strength. The rallying around Dr Balbin should, however, be distinguished from an inflexible, indiscriminate backing, inasmuch as they operate along different lines fo: the most part.

Aside from this general distinction, the meeting will surely have its streaks of disnension, if we bear in mind the individual situations of provinces like Santiago del Estero (Zavalia), San Luis (Amieba Saravia) or Santa Fe (Spina), which despite backing stands that are openly critical of the leadership, are far from supporting the positions of the Alfonsirs faction. There might even be attempts at diversity in Dr Balbin's “circle” that would enable us to conceive of opposing positions, such as could be formulated by Drs Perette and Leon, whose approaches would likewise be different from those of the other sectors we have mentioned.

One of the major issues of thi. meeting, however, will unquestionably be the new figures, some national, some local, who have given rise over the last 12 months to speculation about changes in the party leadership. It is nothing new that Dr de la Rua has been garnering increasing support and that in local federal capital matters Dr Gustavo Soler

has emerged with the undissuised approval of the party leadershin as a new figure (in keeping with successiye statements that, like their "sronosal™ / see ULTIMA CLAVE No 4 » Will now be complemented by a "proposal to politicians"), At the same time, the plenum will find

it hard to avoid consideration of the public declaration formlated

in March document" by Mr Rafael De Stefano (See ULTIMA CLAVE

No 425).

In any case, the indications that Dr Balbin's leadership is finding increasing reaffirmation (while the political thaw lasts) seem obvious, although the meeting itself could constitute a first step by the veteran leader in identifying potential successors.

In Search of Forums

The “development advocates," with their Frigerio, Ferrer or other factions, do not have these problems of succession because they come up with their leaders spontaneously. They have a different problem: finding an aypropriate audience, And it so happens that a number of democrats seem willing to play the game with a curious innocence that, however, calls for a warning.

These remarks stem from observing the proliferation of seminars, acts, symposiums, courses cr formai anda informal meetings in which the development movement has either called the shots or apyveared as an innocent in a strange game of amnesia. Proof of this was, for example, the succession of meetings organized recent’v »y the National Business Forum and now oy the Free Institute of Are itire Studies and Research (ILDEIA). ‘The innccent combi +ic .f a number of Alfonsino lements with the diminished troops of ti. ~ sgerio faction, plus the participation of figures with obvious democratic roots and record, show an unexpected side of Argentine political behavior. A multiple “dialog” (whether multi-party, multi-ideologicel or multi-personal makes no difference) is likely to be confused with the simple task of exchanging views. Nevertheless, we have to be alert and spellout as accurately as possible the undeniable need of the sectors sidelined from civic activities by their political background to regain an “acceptable face" that will enable them to begin their entics again. The National Business Forum was attended by persons of renowned democratic beliefs, as well as by representatives of the most bizarre Gelbardi or Frigerio factions.

A similar phenomenon can be observed in the series of meetings programmed by the ILDEIA at the Argentine Engineers Center, a patently democratic forum,

We have to go into a bit more detail in order to properly gauge the situation when we recognize these strange ties.

Thus, for example, the list of speakers chosen_by the aforementioned forum reads almost like a directory of FAPES / Argentine Foundation

for Social Studies _/:Eroles (director of the FAPES Institute of Social Development), Conte MacDonald (president of FAPES), Storni (director of the Social Investigation and Action Center and a FAPES my wes Aldo Ferrer (ditto), Francisco Suarez (FAPES social development team), Troccoli (FAPES lecturer), Volando (also a speaker), etc. Perhaps a Similar cross section could be drawn up in connection with the ILDEIA meeting.

We should probably not be surprised, then, if we see the FAPES now proposing to hold a seminar, with more or less the same people, whose task would be to define a "national theory." What is a “national theory"? Until now, any sensible person would assume that a nation transcends the limited bounds of a theory. Only two converging sectors resort to definitions and theories of our nation: those from the "development movement" that distill the essence of the "nation" for speculative purposes, and the died-in-the-wool totalitarians, who see the "nation" onl:; as an excuse to display their authoritarian temperament.

“we .

To theorize a nation is akin to trying to attribute to it new and, (way not?) perhaps "advantageous" meanings, inasmuch as it is but a single step from defining a "theory" of a nation to demanding an "iieology" for it, in the finest Leninist tradition.

The most interesting thing about this panorama, we should stress, is the ongoing attempt to find forums, to find an audience, even by resorting to the most unexpected methods and sectors.

The Third World and the Christian Democrats

One would have to deive deeply into the statement issued by the

Christian Democrat Federation (now headed on an "interim" basis by

Mr Enrique De Vedia) on the Sixth Conference of the countries that call themselves "nonalined" (a significant equivocation) inorder to teil to what degree it is an international political pronouncement in the proper sense or a bid by the federation's president to assert himself in the difficult chair that he occupies.

The haste with which Mr De Vedia issued his statement (the first since

he took over as president in an extremely difficult situation—see last week's ULTIMA CLAVE) and the topic itself reveal in an unusual way the urgency, rather than the far-reaching significance, of the issue in question. In passing, however, we should point out that it resorts to the same significant equivocation that evinces the political illusions

that are themselves involved in the matter.

Since an organ is determined by its function, Mr De Vedia had to make "use" of the presidency in order to assert himself in the top spot. No appropriate opportunity was in sight that would not touch off the now controlled internal warring of federation factions, If a national political objective had been proposed, an explosion would most certainly have been triggered. If a party definition (just internal) had been proposed, the explosion would have surely been of an even greater intensity and scope. If, in conclusion, he had merely wanted to come before "public opinion,” perhaps through even the most informal contact with the press, he would have fallen right down to the legs

of the chair in which he sits. It is part and parcel of certain political circumstances, Without internal support in his party and with obvious questioning from the Christian Revolutionary Party, through Dr Dip, Mr De Vedia could obviously have only spoken about the abstract, though accordingly revealing, issue of international politics.

It is within this framework of complex and suggestive references that

the statement tries to obscure the issues with Castroisms, "in view of the apparent intention of the Cuban prime minister, Dr Fidel Castro, to

use the conference of nonalined nations,” it says, "to accuse the

Argentine Government of not having “clear-cut, weil-defined attitudes." We should note here that in the view of the federation the so-called "doctor" (this business of calling people "doctor" is on the rise both in domestic politics and elsewhere, and we ought to investigate how many alleged doctors have really completed their stuiies, if they are not, in fact, usurping titles, right?) has only the "apparent" intention of using the conference, a doubt that in itself constitutes a clear indication of trust.

Tne document begins by asserting that “the nonalined countries

represent a clear alternative for the developing countries vis-a-vis

the U.S.-USER bipolar system," and as far as these souls are concerned, the United States is on an equal footing with communist Russia. It

does not explain how the "Third World" determinations have led numerous countries down an unrestrainable path towards polarization with the USSR.

The most noteworthy aspect, however, is the cadence of language applied to the Sixth Conference and which the statement takes word-for-word, without revisions when it defends the "new international order," with the clear reminiscenses that it attempts to incorporate into history by erasing the past, as Adolf Hitler himself tried to do (and he did not wield the same language in vain).

With the utmost caution, the second point, which spans fewer than four lines, voices a brief warning against attempts to "serve the interests of one of the competing blocs, thus altering the standards that have enabled the nonalined countries to bolster their group over the last decade" (obvious examples that go unmentioned are the "nonalined" countries of the Middle East that fell uncontrollably into the Soviet orbit, or Asian countries like Afghanistan, or Cuba itself). The declaration (which describes the "nonalined nations" as a means of achieving the "self-determination of peoples and International Social Justice," with capital letters) says nothing about the slave traffic that the Arab countries, leaders at the meeting, engage in, or about Cuban jails, or about the pitiful fate of the more than three million Vietnamese expelled by the Hanoi regime (all of these countries were very active members at the conference), unless this is precisely the sort of "International Social Justice" that it is thinking about.

Not content, however, with these steps to shore up the four legs of his chair, Mr De Vedia immediately _made definite political moves within the pec / Popular Christian Party_/ that were perhaps designed to bolster the back of the seat that he now occupies on an interim basis. In his first move, just 24 hours after the other, he gathered together the faction that he heads in the aforementioned party (Frugoni Rey, Conte MacDonald, Bruno, Auyero, Ricci, Armouni, Lagazzio, Taurizano Bosch, Otti, Chironi, Bagli, Bonachi and one person from each of the country's following districts: Jujuy, Santa Fe, Tucuman, Misiones, La Pampa,


Mendoza and a numver of representatives from the three “branches” of the PPC whose approach is similar to Peronism: youths, women and trade wiionists.

Thus, pivoting in his chair and lookix to specific actions and internal party measures for support, Mr De Vedis ended up by conclusively dividing the PPC and by paving the way for the splintering off of the Christian Democrat Federation.

Social Democrat Vi w

In connection with the same matter, that is, the Sixth Conference of Nonalined Countries, which has just concluded in Havana, a document was released last week, signed by members of the Democratic Socialist Party and calling on the government to withdraw Argentina from the organization. The document is signed, among others, by Ramon P, Narvay, Portillo, Domingo R. Distefano, Jose Yanquelevitz, Israel Laubstein, Francisco Ferrari, Jose Pellegrini, Miguel Azzaro, Elisa Campo, Carlos A. Guzman, Miguel Troccoli and Luis Pan, After describing as "timely" and "correct" the official decision not to have Argentina represented in Havana by either President Videla or Foreign Minister Pastor (the mission was entrusted to the undersecretary of San Martin “alace, Commodore Cavandoli), the Social Democrat declaration contends that "even so, the step taken is not enough. The Havana meeting ought to be taken advantage of to make the necessary moves and formulate the corresponding announcements that our country will be withdrawing from the group of ‘nonalined' nations, which we joined in 1973 pursuant to a decision by the Justicialist government."

It adds further on: "If Argentina's presence within this bloc has always been incomprehensible and inexplicable, it is all the more so at the present time, The central debate that will be undertaken in

Havana will revolve around the struggle between two equally totalitarian concepts of the theory and practice of communism. We cannot imagine

the Argentine delegation taking part, even by remaining silent, in such an argument, nor taking stands backing any sort of consensus."

"We understand the changes that have taken place in the world over the last few decades and, accordingly, in the methods and practices of all varieties of international relations, especially diplomatic relations. We do not advocate irrelevant isolationism nor coursesof conduct that would close our eyes to the new realities of an interdependent world and place us in foolish and clumsy positions, But there are necessarily limits to the pragmatism that situations at times demand. It is one thing to maintain good relations and promote trade, but it is another

to make up an entourage that should be alien to us and that in the end, regardless of how much the arguments are twisted, is in service to goals

“— “we

that are totally opposed to ours and to our concept of the individual, oi government and of society." t

In conclusion, it says: “Argentina's continued presence in the bloc is a f source of confusion and ar ongoing manifestation of inconsistency between words and deeds, Hence, this is an appropriate time to make

the proper rectifications, especially because on top of their initial prevarication, all or some of the ‘nonalined' nations are now

proposing (it does not matter whether they ultimately do) to act openly

as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy."

"The country would benefit from a clarification in this regard. We demand one of our national authorities."

Waiting for Things to Clear up

Bogged down by the multitude of factions that every day convey to the various other factions alarming news about the internal situation in their resvective areas of control, the union leaders of the various groupings (the result of attempts at "unity")proposed late last week to work up a sort of "contingency strategy" to try and "overcome the lack of understanding for a period of 2 months." These were, at least, the topics analyzed at an informal meeting Friday night, which continued

on Saturday afternoon, aaong a number of CNT fo National Confederation

of Workers ] leaders and a very small contingent from the group of "25." The meeting, called by Triacca, failed in its bid to bring along the "ejectees" (the group of the "20" that taxi driver and former leader Roberto Garcia deprived of representation for not being loyal to him when he was arrested), and in view of this, to Donaires at least, "all of these people are birds of the same feather and are different only for the time being" (perhaps someone would add that Donaires himself removed his feather only circumstantially).

According to a participant, the meeting "was incoherent, touching upon, skipping and overlooking issues without stopping to consider any."

It was "more an informal chat than a proper meeting” in view of "the ties that we have to finish putting together." Some of the issues "tackled" with the aforementioned "incoherence" were as follows:

What to do about Garcia's opposition to going along with the "ejectees." What news is there from the OAS commission?

Can't something “original” be done, such as stating in a petition that "human rights are also involved in the area of low wages"?

Couldn't we form a commission with the trade unions from the interior, which would then bring in everyone that wanted to join?


What guarantees are the boys from the interior offering?

Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera...

Cangallo Street was undeniably still echoing at the ueeting. During the

call, it was suggested to Garcia that he "postpone his return for as long

as possible, at least ur:til the OAS commission leaves and if possible,

until after 27 September." Garcia allegedly replied in puzzlement: "But hasn't the law come out yet?" (he was referring to the law of associations)

"When is it going to?” The law, he was told, "would be "sanctioned no

sooner than 27 September, and therefore it would be best for you to stay

away until then, so we'll let them get into difficulties by themselves (Triacca?); don't support anything like this with your presence."

Garcia's last telephone call from Europe to a lawyer's office at 1500

Perhaps these were the basic topics discussed last night (a few hours before this edition went to press) at the joint meeting between the "25" and the CNT to see “whether it is finally possible to set up the commission." ‘The dominant tone seemed to be determined more by the expectations surrounding the passage of the new law of associations than by definite expectations of any agreement between the two groupings as

to a “program,”

We will have the chance to say a few things about the agreed upon “unity” in next week's edition,

8743 CSO: 4010


* _


Attitudes Towards the PLO Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 14 Sep 79 p 8 Ll Editorial: "Regarding the Palestinian Problem" 7

fi Text_/ The recent meeting in Haifa between Egyptian President Anwar

Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin did not produce positive

results with regard to the Palestinian problem, which is ticklish like

few others. The Egyptian leader's third visit to Jewish territory

constituted a reaffirmation of the spirit and determination that

brought him to Jerusalem in November 1977, thus laying the groundwork

and creating the spirit that was to bear fruit later on in the Camp

David agreements. "We came to Haifa,” both leaders said in a joint

declaration, "with a message of love and friendship, with a renewed

feeling of hope and confidence in the future." Proof of this was the

agreement to sell Egyptian oil to Israel, although nothing was mentioned

in connection with the established price. As far as the Palestinian

question is concerned, the two chief executives agreed to continue ; studying the matter and “to pursue this objective over the coming months { with renewed vision and a full awareness of our mission." Very sharp differences persist, however, because whereas Sadat mentioned that Cairo

is merely aiding the Palestinians in their self-determination, though

"they themselves will have to negotiate their political destiny,"

Jerusalem proposes to perpetuate the administrative autonomy "of the

Arabs on Israeli land," Begin said, in other words, "in Judea, Samaria

and the Gaza."

The only really new development that came out of the Haifa talks was Sadat's repeated observation that Jordan ought to be (and the possibility could open up towards the end of this year) the natural home of the Palestinians. A solution along these lines seems unlikely though not impossible as time goes by. We must not forget that Jordan occupies

3/4 of the territory (110,000 square kilometers) that the British mandate